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Section 554(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act permits agen-
cies to issue administrative declaratory orders to terminate controversies
or remove uncertainty. Such orders can operate as a summary judg-
ment device to end unnecessary administrative proceedings or as a de-
claratory judgment device to allow agencies to declare the law in a final,
judicially reviewable manner that will not subject an inquirer to agency
sanctions. Professor Powell observes that although agencies have been
willing to use the summary judgment application of the administrative
declaratory order, they have been less inclined to employ it as a declara-
tory judgment device. After examining several situations in which the
declaratory judgment aspect of the administrative declaratory order
might be used effectively, Professor Powell argues that agencies should
begin to use section 554(e) s declaratory judgment power aggressively.
The Article concludes with a set of proposed guidelines for agencies to
follow in rendering advice and issuing declaratory orders.
Section 554(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)1 empowers fed-
eral agencies to issue declaratory orders "to terminate a controversy or remove
uncertainty." 2 The primary purpose of section 554(e) is to provide a mechanism
by which persons who are subject to regulation by federal agencies can secure
judicial review of disputed legal positions without risk of agency sanctions. This
Article discusses what an administrative declaratory order is and when it might
be used to achieve this purpose. The discussion proceeds from definitional to
operational concerns: part I of the Article defines the summary judgment and
t Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. B.A. 1970, University of Mis-
souri-Kansas City; J.D. 1973, University of Wisconsin; LL.M. 1979, Harvard University. The au-
thor gratefully acknowledges the support extended by the Administrative Conference of the United
States and the work of Research Assistants Peter Konolige and Gina Reyman.
1. The Administrative Procedure Act was originally enacted in 1946, Pub. L. No. 404, ch.
324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), and was repealed and replaced in 1966. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 381
(1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982)). See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AT-
TORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 59-60 (1947) (discuss-
ing how and when a declaratory order can be issued). See generally I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE § 4.10, at 267 (1958) (distinguishing declaratory orders from other types of agency
decisions).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1982) (originally codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5(d)) (An "agency, with like
effect as in the case of other orders, and in its sound discretion, may issue a declaratory order to
terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty."). For an historical and policy examination of the
provision, see Powell, Sinners; Supplicants and Samaritans Agency Advice Giving in Relation to
Section 554(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 N.C.L. REv. 339 0985).
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declaratory judgment applications of declaratory orders; part II analyzes the
relationship of administrative declaratory orders to the APA's scope of judicial
review provision;3 and part III examines several cases illustrating instances in
which declaratory orders might be used to the advantage of agencies and the
public. In part IV the Article makes recommendations for increased agency use
of the advice-giving function of the declaratory order.
I. INTRODUCTION
The declaratory order is an adjudicatory procedure4 for securing an admin-
istratively final,5 judicially reviewable declaration of the law. Unlike interpretive
rules,6 policies, and guidelines, which indicate how an agency might apply the
law in some future circumstance,7 the declaratory order applies the law to a
3. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) provides that a "reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions" that do not meet any of six standards. In every case
agency action must be set aside if it is:
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right; or
(D) without observance of procedure required by law.
Id § 706(2)(A)-(D).
In certain other narrowly limited situations, the agency action must be set aside if it is not
supported by "substantial evidence in a case subject to [§§ 556 and 557 of the APA] or otherwise
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute." See id § 706(2)(E); Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1971) (discussing application of § 706
(2)(E)). In other situations involving equally narrow circumstances, the reviewing court engages in a
de novo review of the action; if the action is determined to be "unwarranted by the facts," the court
must set it aside. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1982); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1971) (discussing application of § 706(2)(F)).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (1982) defines adjudication as the "agency process for the formulation of
an order." An order is defined as "the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative,
negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but
including licensing." Id. § 551(6). See United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245
(1973) (distinguishing between "proceedings for the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or
standards" (rulemaking) and "proceedings designed to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases"
(adjudication)).
5. Definition of "final agency action" is not difficult in the abstract. It simply means that the
position of the agency has reached the procedural stage within the agency at which its application of
the law to a person is not amenable to change by further substantive review. See Abbott Laborato-
ries v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-56 (1967) (discussing how "final agency action" has been defined
and applied). As Abbott Laboratories shows, however, agencies and the public often disagree regard-
ing whether an agency's position has a substantive impact or remains amenable to change. See also
City of Miami v. ICC, 669 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1982) (court held, despite agency's protest, that a
commission order issued under § 554(c) was a nonreviewable advisory ruling rather than a final
reviewable order).
6. Interpretive rules are without legal effect; they simply indicate how an agency intends to
apply the law if the appropriate occasion arises. In contrast, legislative rulemaking establishes stan-
dards that are immediately enforceable by sanctions against violators. See I K. DAvis, supra note 1,
§ 5.05, at 314; see also United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973) (court
found respondents' reliance on U.S. Army Corps of Engineers regulations deprived them of adequate
warning of potential misconduct); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (court held agency
reliance on rulings under the Fair Labor Standards Act proper, but remanded for factual
determination).
7. See United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973); Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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concrete set of facts. Because the declaratory order determines the legal rights
of specifically affected individuals, it is immediately ripe for judicial review.
Declaratory orders are issued at the discretion of the agency.8 Under the
APA, the only formal requisite for issuance of a declaratory order is the require-
ment that such orders be issued in aid of an adjudication required "to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."9 If this re-
quirement is met, a declaratory order may be issued either before a person is
formally threatened with agency sanctions or after the agency has begun the
hearing process preliminary to such sanctions.
The declaratory order provides a mechanism for expeditiously resolving
disputes between the agency and those subject to the agency's regulations. It is
particularly valuable in the following situations: (1) when the continued use of
trial type procedures in a hearing is no longer appropriate; 10 (2) when it is possi-
ble to avoid a formal adjudicatory hearing that may lead to agency sanctions by
resolving disagreements about interpretations of the law;'1 and (3) when trial
type procedures are inappropriate because collateral estoppel in an analogous
case makes formal procedures unnecessary. 12 When the continued use of trial
type procedures becomes inappropriate in agency proceedings, the declaratory
order provision of the APA authorizes agencies to issue administrative summary
judgment 13 orders. This use of the declaratory order provision is the one most
favored by agencies. As a summary judgment device, the declaratory order
8. The availability of declaratory orders is limited by the provision allowing an agency to issue
such orders "in its sound discretion." 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1982). This provision does not, however,
give agencies absolute discretion. The decision whether to issue a declaratory order must be consis-
tent with all other exercises of agency discretion: it should reflect a weighing of the relevant consid-
erations and be free from arbitrary or capricious conduct by the agency. See Intercity Transp. Co. v.
United States, 737 F.2d 103, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Powell, supra note 2, at 358 n.70.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982); see also Powell, supra note 2, at 360 (discussing interaction of
§ 554(a) and § 554(e)).
10. The United States Supreme Court made clear in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,
351 U.S. 192 (1956), that full use of the formal hearing procedures under the APA is not required in
every case. Such procedures should be used only when they are likely to generate facts necessary to
an understanding and determination of the dispute or to aid judicial review. Accord Abbott Labora-
tories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); see infra text accompanying note 26.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 14-18.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 19-20.
13. The term "administrative summary judgment" has had a relatively short existence. It was
first approved by the United States Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning,
Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 617 (1973). Previously the term had been used in U.S.V. Pharmaceutical Corp.
v. Secretary of HEW, 466 F.2d 455, 460-66 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also American Cyanamid Co. v.
FDA, 606 F.2d 1307, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (court remanded for further agency proceedings despite
recognizing "a rather broad area in which FDA may properly enter administrative summary judg-
ment"); Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 602 F.2d 452 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (court distinguished situations in which an administrative summary judgment order would be
appropriate); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 697-98 (2d Cir.) (court
held that an agency "may follow streamlined procedures designed to avoid the endless delays that
have tended to paralyze adjudicatory hearings and render them ineffective as means of utilizing
agency expertise"), cert denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); Hess & Clark, Division of Rhodia v. FDA, 495
F.2d 975, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (court held that FDA "summary judgment" regulations must be
applied consistently with basic fairness); E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 1382, 1386 (3d
Cir. 1973) (court stated that before a court of appeals may affirm an administrative summary judg-
ment, it must be certain that no genuine issues of material fact are in dispute).
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eliminates unnecessary evidentiary hearings when no genuine issue of material
fact exists.
The least appreciated application of the declaratory order permits an
agency to state the law in a manner that does not penalize noncompliance but
merely sets forth the agency's view of the law. 14 Such noncoercive orders afford
a means by which the agency's view can be tested judicially without subjecting
the inquirer to punishment.1 5 In these circumstances the declaratory order re-
sponds to the predicament of the individual who is uncertain about the require-
ments of a statute or regulation; it eliminates the need to choose between
desisting from contemplated action to avoid threatened agency sanctions or pur-
posefllly disregarding the agency's views to initiate a legal test of the law's inter-
pretation. 16 Like its judicial counterpart, the declaratory judgment, 17 the
administrative declaratory order allows legal rights and duties to be resolved
before disputants engage in conduct for which they may be held liable. The
declaratory order thus overcomes delays that often arise when courts resolve
administrative disputes.' 8
The declaratory order provisions of the APA also permit agencies to give
adjudicatory decisions, including past declaratory orders, preclusive effect-the
14. See 1K. DAvIS, supra note 1, § 4.10, at 268; City of Miami v. ICC, 669 F.2d 219 (5th Cir.
1982) (denying the Commission's power to issue judicially reviewable declaratory orders). But see
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 328
n.6 (1971) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that NLRB has statutory authority to issue declaratory
orders). For a hypothetical discussion based on Lockridge, see Powell, supra note 2, at 340.
15. Some commentators have suggested that agencies view this advisory aspect of the declara-
tory order as one of the procedure's most troubling characteristics. See, e.g., L. JAI'P & N.
NATHENSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND MATERiALs 307 (4th ed. 1976). Such agency
guidance implicates the agency in the process of undermining and breeding disrespect for its own
regulatory role by counseling would-be wrongdoers about just how far and in which directions they
can go without technically being in violation of the law. The alternative, of course, is an agency that
is able to usurp additional authority simply by threatening to seek sanctions against conduct that the
agency dislikes, but which is, in actuality, at the vague outer boundaries of permissible conduct.
16. It is possible to argue that regulated persons are only rarely forced to risk agency sanctions
to test underlying legal principles by judicial review because at least some agencies give informal
advice freely and communicate with those they regulate to work out alternatives to confrontation.
But see infra text accompanying notes 99-110 (detailing background of Bituminious Coal Operators'
Ass'n v. Secretary of Interior, 547 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1977), in which mining companies were forced
to await sanctions and mount a lengthy court challenge to resolve a question of agency authority);
see also Powell, supra note 2, at 347 n.36 (description of an informal agency study concerning the use
and nonuse of the declaratory order).
17. Declaratory Judgment Act, Pub. L. No. 733, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 964 (1948) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1982)); see 3 K. DAVIs, supra note 1, § 23.04, at 308-09 (dis-
cussing injunctive and declaratory judgment proceedings for review of administrative decisions in
the United States in general and Declaratory Judgment Act specifically). See generally E.
BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 128-31 (2d ed. 1941) (discussing history and evolution of
declaratory judgment proceedings in England).
18. The doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and ripeness pose two of the major
hurdles delaying judicial resolutions of administrative disputes. Broadly speaking, the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies requires completion of administrative action before a judicial
forum is made available. See 3 K. DAvis, supra note 1, § 20.02, at 57. The doctrine of ripeness
seeks to ensure that courts adjudicate only real controversies and not mere hypothetical questions.
See id. § 21.01, at 116. Unfortunately, courts often apply these doctrines capriciously. See Powell,
supra note 2, at 341 n.7 (discussing Supreme Court treatment of the doctrine of ripeness); id. at 354
n.62 (discussing judicial treatment of exhaustion of remedies). For a succinct comparison of trial
and administrative hearings, see G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PRocESS 28-30 (1980).
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effect of barring future litigation by all persons who were afforded an opportu-
nity to participate in the hearing that generated the order.19 When collateral
estoppel is appropriate, the agency may employ the administrative summary




A. In Relation to Civil Procedure
1. Summary Judgment
Administrative declaratory orders have both summary judgment and de-
claratory judgment applications.2 1 Reflecting its counterpart under rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,2 2 the summary judgment application pro-
19. Stare decisis and collateral estoppel applications of the declaratory order are not new. In
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 759, 766 (1969), a plurality of the Supreme Court recognized
that an order issuing from a formal adjudication may be used to establish the law for a subsequent
adjudication. More recently and without elaboration, the Court approved the use of administrative
summary judgment based on collateral estoppel, observing that a "single administrative proceeding
in which each manufacturer may be heard is constitutionally permissible measured by the require-
ments of procedural due process." Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609,
625 (1973) (emphasis added). Accordingly, so long as an individual is given an opportunity to be
heard in an administrative proceeding, that individual will be collaterally estopped from protesting
an order rendered in that proceeding or in a subsequent proceeding.
Even without § 554(e) of the APA, the due process requirement that like cases be treated in a
like fashion would require that administrative declaratory orders be given preclusive effect in appro-
priate situations. What § 554(e) adds through its administrative summary judgment mechanism is
statutory confirmation that the process of applying cases as precedent need not always entail a for-
mal hearing.
20. In Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 626 (1973), the
Supreme Court found that considerations of efficiency, safety, and administrative expertise justified
giving preclusive effect to administrative declaratory orders.
21. The terms "summary judgment" and "declaratory judgment" are used here to contrast the
different circumstances in which an agency might issue a declaratory order. The former type of
declaratory order is issued in the context of a hearing, and the latter is issued prior to the time the
hearing process commences. Thus, the salient consideration is whether the agency is focusing on a
current or future dispute. Because no factual dispute is present in either circumstance, however, a
civil procedure purist might be tempted to characterize orders issued in both contexts as "summary
judgments." Conversely it might be suggested that because both circumstances involve agencies in
declaring the law and rights of a petitioner, "declaratory judgments" would be an appropriate single
designation. Use of the single designation "summary judgment" is misleading, however, because the
analogous judicial "summary judgment" carries the connotation of ending a trial proceeding, a dis-
position which is here associated with the agencies' sanctioning processes. Use of the single term
"declaratory judgment" also may be misleading because declaratory orders-unlike declaratory
judgments-are not limited solely to circumstances in which a neutral arbiter is petitioned for a
determination of the law. The agency itself may act on its own inititative to terminate a dispute or
remove uncertainty.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment); 10A C. WmGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2725, at 75-83 (2d ed. 1983). Because "the principal judicial
inquiry required by Rule 56 is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists," id. at 75, summary
judgment is appropriate to resolve issues involving legal construction, legislative history, and legal
sufficiency. Concerning the relationship between summary judgment and collateral estoppel, the
authors of this treatise have observed that a "summary judgement, of course, is a decision on the
merits of the case. Thus, a Rule 56 motion will be granted on the basis of former adjudication when
an earlier summary judgement has disposed of the same issue between sufficiently related parties."
Id. § 2735, at 445; see also Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 625
(1973) (recognizing that an order issuing from a formal adjudication may be used to establish the law
in a subsequent adjudication).
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vides a formalized mechanism by which agencies can give advice in the adjudica-
tory context and permits avoidance of merely dilatory uses of the APA's
adjudicatory procedures.
23
The availability of declaratory orders allows agencies to balance the utility
of conducting full, formal adjudicatory hearings against the actual needs of per-
sons affected by agency action. 24 When there is no genuine issue of material fact
and no need for formal evidentiary procedures, agencies can terminate cases by
summary judgment. Additionally, when the agency is applying legal principles
to claims that have been directly or collaterally adjudicated, the summary judg-
ment application of the order obviates the need for formal evidentiary proce-
dures. 25 The summary judgment use of the declaratory order, therefore, shares
with rule 56 the objective of assuring that the process afforded for the resolution
of disputes does not itself become the means by which disputes and disputed
wrongdoing are prolonged. It ensures that neither members of the public nor
federal agencies are allowed to gain unfair advantages as a result of meaningless
procedural steps.26 Judicial review of an agency's determination is made avail-
able quickly so that government cannot engage in prohibited conduct or delay in
discharging its responsibilities.
2. Declaratory Judgment
The policies of avoiding delay and restraining government action also un-
derlie the declaratory judgment application of the declaratory order. In addition
to ensuring that government agencies do not overreach, 27 the declaratory judg-
ment application prevents agencies from deterring lawful conduct by threatening
to impose agency sanctions.28 Whereas the summary judgment application of
the declaratory order emphasizes the policy of timely judicial review to control
agency conduct that exceeds legal authority, the declaratory judgment applica-
23. See supra note 4 (distinction between adjudication and rulemaking); see also supra notes 10
& 20 and accompanying text (concerning the need to allow agencies to terminate disputes without
using the full panoply of procedural safeguards usually available for formal adjudicatory
proceedings).
24. Compare Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 626 (1973) (no
individualized hearing is necessary when termination of a controversy is of prime importance) with 5
U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982) ("applies. . . in every. . . adjudication required to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing .... ").
25. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
26. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 626 (1973) (discussing
the need to free agencies from the bureaucratic straight-jacket of individualized adjudications); see
also 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1982) (authorizing judicial action when an agency has unlawfully delayed
action).
27. Because declaratory orders are subject to review by federal courts of appeal, they provide a
mechanism for judicial supervision of agency conduct. The authors of one treatise have observed:
Oversight of the agencies by the three branches of government seeks to achieve both the
political and legal accountability of agency action. . . . The ultimate goal is to assure the
legitimacy in our governmental system of assigning important policymaking decisions to
appointed bureaucrats. . . . In other words, in many ways it is the relationships the agen-
cies have with the constitutional branches of government that gives them their warrant to
govern us.
G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, supra note 18, at 27.
28. See supra note 16.
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tion recognizes that an agency can also overreach by forcing members of the
public to choose between desisting from arguably legal action or facing agency
sanctions.2 9 Attempting to persuade agencies to change their view of the law is
arduous.30 Indeed, agency resistance to such persuasion can chill even the most
principled assertion of legal rights. The declaratory judgment use of the order
prevents the chilling of lawful conduct by providing a mechanism by which
members of the public can assert their legal rights and test the agency's legal
authority judicially without first facing agency sanctions for engaging in dis-
puted conduct.3 1
B. In Relation to Section 706 of the APA
Section 706 of the APA32 specifies the scope of judicial review of agency
action. When agency action is unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,
section 706 allows courts to compel agencies to act. 33 Section 706 also autho-
rizes courts to set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions for any of six
reasons.
34
The scope of review criteria of section 70635 broadly outlines the circum-
stances in which declaratory orders may be used appropriately. For example,
when an agency concludes after initiation of the sanctioning process that it is
ready to test the soundness of its view of the law, 36 the summary judgment use
29. The threat of agency sanction is implicit in an agency's grant of authority to regulate a
particular activity. The threat means that as regulated individuals make plans to act they must bear
in mind that the regulators may take an entirely different view of the legitimacy of their proposed
conduct. Whether it is an association of optometrists considering the Food and Drug Administra-
tion's likely response to their members' decision to begin providing contact lens fitting services; a
group of Alaskan natives considering how the Federal Maritime Commission will react to its desire
to initiate a small barge operation between Alaska's island villages; or a giant chemical manufacturer
wondering whether the Occupational Health and Safety Administration could properly require it to
label its paint products as arsenical, the planning need is the same. In each instance the regulated
persons could benefit by use of a mechanism to obtain a quick, final agency determination as to the
legality of the proposed conduct that can, if necessary, be immediately reviewed by a court of ap-
peals. These and similar situations involving the uncertainties of planning in the face of government
regulation were advanced by interviewees at the respective agencies during a 1983 study of the use
and nonuse of the declaratory order. For a description of that study, see Powell, supra note 2, at 347
n.36.
30. See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRun%, supra note 18, at 29 (cataloguing the typical
steps of an adjudicatory proceeding: complaint, answer, discovery, prehearing conferences, hearings
on motions, presentation of evidence, cross-examination, rulings on issues, oral argument, written
exceptions, and the agency's decision). The authors conclude: "In general, therefore, a lawyer ex-
perienced in litigating cases in state or federal courts will not find an administrative hearing to be
unfamiliar." Id.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18 (discussing necessity of disregarding agency's
views to institute legal challenge to agency's approach when declaratory order is not used).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
33. Section 706 was intended to codify the judicial practice of reviewing agency action existing
at the time of its adoption. DEP'T oF JusTic, supra note 1, at 108. As Attorney General Tom
Clark explained, "Orders in the nature of a writ of mandamus have been employed to compel an
administrative agency to act,. . . or to assume jurisdiction, .. or to compel an agency or officer to
perform a ministerial or non-discretionary act." Id.
34. See Id at 108-10 (interpreting the judicial review provisions of the APA); see also supra
note 3 (listing the six review considerations).
35. See supra note 3.
36. The declaratory order offers an expedited means of getting a dispute before a court for
1986]
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of the declaratory order provides the appropriate route to judicial review. Like-
wise, when an agency seeks to preclude a dispute by the use of precedent or
collateral estoppel, the lawfulness of the agency's action may be tested by judi-
cial review of its summary judgment use of the declaratory order. Finally, when
a dispute concerns only the lawfulness or factual appropriateness of proposed
agency action and no sanctioning proceeding has been commenced, the declara-
tory judgment use of the declaratory order provides the appropriate vehicle for
judicial review. In the first two instances, agencies are empowered to terminate
controversies, 37 and in the third, they are authorized to remove uncertainties
that might otherwise lead to such controversies.
38
As a result of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in United States
v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 39 Federal Power Commission v. Texaco,4° and Wein-
berger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc.,41 agency use of the administrative
summary judgment has won increasing acceptance.42 This development should
be applauded; no good reason exists for proceeding with a formal hearing in the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Neither congressional intent nor
due process requires a formal hearing when it appears from an applicant's plead-
ings that the claim is without merit.
43 Furthermore, as Hynson made clear,
4 4
the summary judgment policy denying formal hearings to pleaders who fail to
allege any genuine factual issue can be applied to deny formal hearings to dispu-
tants who raise issues that have already been adjudicated by similarly situated
disputants.4 5
Despite some willingness to embrace the summary judgment use of the de-
claratory order,46 agencies remain generally unreceptive to the declaratory judg-
judicial review. The determinations that are most amenable to declaratory order disposition are
those in which no significant factual disputes are involved. Although use of the declaratory order is
not explicitly limited to controversies involving undisputed facts, the declaratory order does not
apply neatly to a hearing that turns on disputed facts. Under 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1982), the trier of
fact may limit submission of evidence when the evidence would be cumulative, redundant, or irrele-
vant. Termination of a proceeding to avoid material evidence concerning disputed facts would prob-
ably constitute an abuse of discretion. Orders following the closing of a hearing after exclusion of
nonmaterial evidence, therefore, would be described more properly as instances when the agency
sufficiently developed the record and chose to issue its order accordingly.
37. See Powell, supra note 2, at 361-63 (detailed legislative history).
38. See id.
39. 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956) (stating that Federal Communications Commission could refuse a
hearing to a licensee under its valid rule, unless the licensee could demonstrate a reason for a waiver
of the rule).
40. 377 U.S. 33, 39 (1964) (upholding Federal Power Commission's summary rejection of ap-
plication without a hearing pursuant to agency's own guidelines).
41. 412 U.S. 609, 617-21 (1973) (upholding FDA's "administrative summary judgment" proce-
dures pertaining to premarketing clearance for drugs).
42. See also supra note 13 (citing cases involving administrative summary judgment).
43. Hynson, 412 U.S. at 621.
44. In Hynson the Court upheld the application of a Food and Drug Administration order to
pharmaceutical companies that were not the primary targets of the agency's original proceeding. Id.
at 626.
45. See supra note 20.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 126-28 (concerning growing awareness of the summary
judgment use of the declaratory order).
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ment use of the order.47 This coolness may be the result of agency unfamiliarity
with the declaratory judgment application, inadvertent neglect,48 concerns with
ripeness, 49 or the inadvertent neglect, fear of encouraging wrongdoing. 50 In ad-
dition, agencies sometimes assert that the device lacks utility, either because it is
procedurally cumbersome or because it is anachronistic in its view of the admin-
istrative process. 5 ' Scrutiny of these contentions, however, suggests that they
are rationalizations rather than explanations. The result of agencies' reluctance
to use the declaratory order to test legal positions is that the power of the agen-
cies is enhanced at the expense of those who are regulated.5 2 By avoiding issu-
ing declaratory orders, an agency limits the opportunities for judicial review of
its decisions and makes the process for obtaining such review costly and time-
consuming. Thus, by refusing to issue a declaratory order an agency often can
exercise authority without fear of judicial restraint.
Administrative and judicial endorsement of the declaratory order would
have important salutary effects on the operations of administrative agencies and
reviewing courts and, most importantly, on the public. Increased recognition of
such orders would further the twin policies of judicial review under section
706-limiting agencies to lawfully exercised powers and avoiding delay.5 3 Other
potential benefits of the declaratory order are suggested by the following discus-
sion of six dispute situations in which administrative and judicial expertise were
or could have been utilized more effectively through use of a declaratory order.
III. SoME PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
A. Actions That Are Arbitrary or Capricious
Ambach v. Bell 54 represents a situation in which agency use of a declara-
tory order might expedite resolution of a protracted legal dispute. The issue in
Ambach was whether it was arbitrary and capricious for the Secretary of Educa-
tion, proceeding under the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of
47. See Powell, supra note 2, at 344 n.18, 348 n.37, 370 n.157, 371 n.159.
48. See generally Comment, Declaratory Orders--Uncertain Tools to Remove Uncertainty, 21
AD. L. REv. 257 (1968) (Report of the American Bar Association's Subcommittee on Declaratory
Orders of the Administrative Process Committee of the Administrative Law Section) (most agencies
studied had not adopted declaratory order regulations specifically pursuant to § 554(e)).
49. See supra text accompanying note 7; supra note 18. The Court in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134 (1944), held that an agency's advisory opinions and policy statements are not binding
because they are merely statements about how the agency will seek to apply the law in the future.
Id. at 140. Absent an attempt by the agency to apply its view of the law through a legislative rule
with substantive impact, therefore, the matter is not ripe for judicial review. See also Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (policy statement by agency is
not determinative but only announces agency's intended future policy).
50. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
51. Because courts in recent years have asserted authority to review an agency's informal ex-
pressions of opinion, see Powell, supra note 2, at 353 n.59, agencies may argue that there now exists
no need for an administrative device such as § 554(e), which was intended to assure that an ag-
grieved party would, prior to suffering some significant injury, be able to secure judicial review.
52. See Powell, supra note 2, at 353-56.
53. See supra text accompanying note 26.
54. 686 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
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1981, 55 to allocate funds to states under a formula based on 1970 rather than
1980 Bureau of the Census data.56 Concluding that time was of the essence in
the allocation process and that he was likely to be sued by some disfavored recip-
ient regardless of his decision, the Secretary decided to proceed.5 7 Within two
weeks of the notice of his decision to proceed and within a week of his issuance
of a memorandum explaining his decision, plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunc-
tion to enjoin the Secretary's use of the 1970 census data. After a hearing ap-
proximately thirty days later, plaintiffs were granted an order barring
disbursement of the funds.58 The district court held that the Secretary's refusal
to delay funding until 1980 data were available was arbitrary and capricious. 59
It was not until July 23, 1982-some seven months following the Secretary's
recognition that the probable unavailability of the 1980 census data would re-
quire use of the 1970 data-that the Secretary succeeded in having the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacate the injunc-
tion and vindicate his original legal position.
Ambach is troubling because the process-from identification of the dispute
through injunction in the district court and review in the court of appeals-was
predictable and, therefore, needlessly protracted. Such delays are characteristic
of many cases in which a court enjoins an agency from acting arbitrarily or
capriciously. 60 The Secretary apparently failed to realize that he could avoid
this protracted delay by using a declaratory order. Because he had the authority
to adjudicate terminations or reductions in entitlements,6 1 the Secretary was em-
powered to issue a declaratory order setting forth the legal rights of grantees.
62
As soon as he decided to fix the legal relationships of fund recipients on the basis
of the 1970 data, he could have tested his view of the law by issuing a declara-
tory order.63 A declaratory order would have removed uncertainty about the
legality of the Secretary's course of action by providing a final agency order that
55. 20 U.S.C. § 3801 (1982).
56. Ambach, 686 F.2d at 980.
57. Id. at 977.
58. The district court preliminarily enjoined any distribution of funds in excess of the amounts
already guaranteed by statute. Id. at 978.
59. Id. at 981 (citing the district court's Memorandum Opinion at 7-8).
60. See, eg., American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 661 F.2d 340, 354-57 (5th Cir. 1981) (agency's
arbitrary and capricious reclassification of oilwells from "coastal" to "on-shore" without a cost anal-
ysis resulted in a delay in implementing final effluent guidelines for the oil and gas extraction point
source category); National Pork Producers Council v. Bergland, 484 F. Supp. 540, 544-47 (D. Iowa)
(Secretary of Agriculture's use of traditional labels for uncured meats was arbitrary and capricious
and delayed implementation of program to get cured meat labels into the market), rev'd, 631 F.2d
1353 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
61. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 2835-2836 (1982).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9 (discussing agencies' authority to issue declaratory
orders).
63. Either an agency or an aggrieved person can initiate the declaratory order process. See 5
U.S.C. § 554(e) (1982); see also id. § 702 ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action is entitled to judicial review thereof."). For a
review of the legislative history concerning declaratory orders and a consideration of contrasting
proposals that would have allowed issuance of declaratory orders only upon petition by aggrieved
persons, see Powell, supra note 2, at 362.
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could immediately be reviewed by the court of appeals. Given such a course, the
dispute probably could have been resolved in one month.
Such a strategy can be beneficial to recipients of agency services as well as
to the agency. For example, the declaratory order provides a means to test
threatened terminations of benefits when a recipient requires expedited review,
as was true in National Welfare Rights Organization v. Mathews.64 Mathews
involved an eight-month trek from denial of injunctive relief in -the district court
to invalidation of agency regulations in the court of appeals under section
706(2)(A) of the APA. 65 At issue was an attempt by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare to establish upper limits for property ownership by re-
cipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children. 66 The reviewing court
held that the proposed rule conflicted with the Department's enabling statute by
valuing property on an insufficient factual record and without regard to
encumbrances.
67
As did the agency in Ambach, it is likely that the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare anticipated the suit in Mathews. The Department had
received fifty-seven comments in response to its notice of proposed rulemak-
ing.68 In both cases only legal issues needed to be resolved. Under these cir-
cumstances, the issuance of a declaratory order to remove uncertainty would
have provided a less dilatory route to appellate review.
69
B. Actions That Constitute an Abuse of Discretion
Agency overreaching of another sort was at issue in Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission,70 in which the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Phelps Dodge's alleged viola-
tion of a rule requiring "[e]lectrically powered equipment [to] be de-energized
before mechanical work is done on such equipment." 7 1 Plaintiff did not ques-
tion the facial validity of the regulation, but argued that it had been applied
incorrectly to establish a violation. The Commission challenged Phelps Dodge's
failure to install preventive-use electrical shutoff devices on an electrically pow-
ered steel conveyor belt. 72 At the time of the alleged violation, the corporation's
employees were standing on the inoperative conveyor belt to reach and unclog
64. 533 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
65. Section 706(2)(A) provides: "The reviewing court shall . . .(2) hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be... (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982) (granting the Secretaries of Treasury, Labor, and Health and
Human Services power to make and publish necessary rules and regulations under the Social Secur-
ity Act); 40 Fed. Reg. 12,507-08 (1975) (implementing regulations for Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children program).
67. Mathews, 533 F.2d at 647-49.
68. Id. at 639.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12 (discussion of situations in which use of declara-
tory order expedites review).
70. 681 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1982).
71. 30 C.F.R. §§ 55.12-.16 (1983) (repealed 1984).
72. Phelps Dodge, 681 F.2d at 1192.
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ore from a nonelectrically powered chute that fed the conveyor.73 Phelps Dodge
argued that the regulation did not apply in this circumstance because the true
purpose of the regulation was to protect workers from the hazard of electrical
shock, not from hazards resulting from attempts to remove rocks from the
chute. 74
More than three years after the alleged violation,7 5 the court of appeals held
that the Commission had abused its discretion in applying the regulation to the
facts of Phelps Dodge.76 Issuance of a declaratory order would have provided a
more efficient way to resolve the dispute. If Phelps Dodge had obtained a de-
claratory order, the dispute, which involved no contested issues of fact, could
have gone directly from the Commission to the court of appeals.7 7 The matter
could have been resolved in six months.78 An alternative scenario is also con-
ceivable. If Phelps Dodge had anticipated the Commission's enforcement ac-
tion, the corporation could have asked for an immediate declaration whether the
regulation in question applied to the practices challenged by the Commission. If
such a request for a declaratory order had been made and granted, the parties'
legal fees and time costs would have been greatly reduced.
7 9
Charges of abuse of discretion arising from agency application of a facially
applicable regulation to undisputed facts can also arise in more subtle ways,
such as when an agency initiates a proceeding that is plainly beyond its jurisdic-
tion as a matter of law or conducts a proceeding in a manner that cannot lead to
a valid order.80 Both abuses were alleged in Pepsico, Inc. v. FTC.8 1
In Pepsico the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
jected Pepsico's claim that the FrC was prohibited from prosecuting a cease and
desist order to end practices that hindered competition in the distribution and
sale of certain syrups and soft drink products. Although the FTC had failed to
join 513 Pepsico bottlers through whom the company's alleged competitive re-
straints were implemented, the court held that Pepsico had not established that
the proceeding was an administrative nullity.8 2 In the court's view, Pepsico had
73. Id. at 1191.
74. Id. at 1192.
75. The alleged violation occurred June 6, 1979, and was resolved three years later by the
decision of the court of appeals on July 22, 1982. See Phelps Dodge, 681 F.2d at 1189, 1191.
76. Id. at 1193.
77. It is doubtful that an administrative law judge should have been involved in this dispute at
all. Because the case concerned only the application of law to undisputed facts, the administrative
law judge properly could have requested that the agency respond directly by declaratory order.
78. The court of appeals required less than six months to resolve the matter. Phelps Dodge, 681
F.2d at 1193.
79. As it was, resolution of the uncertainty required several administrative steps: citation, pen-
alty hearing, petition for reconsideration of agency determination, and review by the court of ap-
peals. Id. at 1191.
80. See, ag., American Communications Ass'n v. United States, 298 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962);
Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 286 F.2d 539 (D.C. (tir. 1960). In both cases, the FCC
had not permitted interested parties to participate in hearings, and the courts required the FCC to
allow the parties to intervene. Because necessary parties had not been included, the agency conduct
could not have led to a valid order.
81. 472 F.2d 179 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 877 (1972).
82. Id. at 187-90.
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failed to show the kind of waste of government resources and continuing eco-
nomic threat necessary to trigger prehearing protection from an agency proceed-
ing.83 Nevertheless, the court's recognition of the possibility of protective
prehearing injunctive relief suggests that a declaratory order could have served
two useful purposes. First, a declaratory order determining the validity of Pep-
sico's proposed bottlers contract could have resolved the parties' pure questions
of law concerning the validity of the allegedly anticompetitive contract provi-
sions. Second, a declaratory order could have efficiently resolved the question
whether a party's absence made the FTC's enforcement proceeding a nullity.
84
In either situation, use of the declaratory order would have promoted both par-
ties' interest in using the most expeditious procedure to eliminate uncertainty.
C. When the Agency's Actions Allegedly Are Not in Accordance With Law
Obremski v. Office of Personnel Management 85 arose after John Obremski
had spent nearly four years trying to secure administrative confirmation that his
job as a corporate quality assurance manager for the Federal Prison Industries
86
qualified him for employer contributions to his retirement fund at the rate pre-
scribed for "law enforcement officers." 87 As the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit recounted in barely disguised irritation:
"Unfortunately, although petitioner was already performing as a 'law enforce-
ment officer' pursuant to a written job description, he faced a bureaucratic stone-
wall when he sought confirmation of his status."88 The issue before the court
was a narrow one: whether petitioner's duties required him to have "frequent
.. . direct contact" with federal prisoners within the meaning of the relevant
statutes defining law enforcement positions.
89
Obremski contended that he was a "law enforcement officer" because job
related visits to prisons consumed thirty percent of his worktime. 90 The Office
of Personnel Management, 91 however, asserted that Obremski failed to meet the
83. Id. at 187.
84. Although an appeal of a declaratory order determining whether all necessary parties had
been joined would have been an interlocutory appeal, there is nothing in the legislative history of
§ 554(e) to prohibit use of the declaratory order resulting in interlocutory appeal. In fact, the legisla-
tive history is silent as to precise situations in which the declaratory order might be used. See Pow-
ell, supra note 2, at 364. Because declaratory orders are issued in the discretion of the agency, they
should be available with respect to any substantive question an agency may designate, including
questions leading to interlocutory appeals. This approach recognizes that when an agency is amena-
ble to such a determination equity and efficiency usually support its availability. If the question is
sufficiently troubling to gain the agency's support for early judicial determination, it is also likely to
involve issues of sufficient gravity so that awaiting a final administrative resolution would be costly
to those regulated.
85. 699 F.2d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
86. Id. at 1265 n.1. The Federal Prison Industries is a government corporation that provides
current employment and job training to inmates of the federal prisons through a network of factories
within the prison system. See 18 U.S.C. § 4121 (1982) (statutory authorization of Federal Prison
Industries).
87. Obremski, 699 F.2d at 1266.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1265.
90. Id. at 1267.
91. The Office of Personnel Management, which oversees the conditions of federal employment,
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statutory requirement of "frequent direct contact" with federal prisoners be-
cause he was not "primarily in direct contact with individuals in ... deten-
tion." 92 The court of appeals ultimately resolved the matter in Obremski's
favor. Because the Office of Personnel Management did not contest Obremski's
factual assertion that he spent thirty percent of his worktime in visits to prisons,
the parties could have used the declaratory order's declaratory judgment appli-
cation to expedite a resolution. Obremski could have sought immediate review
of such a declaratory order in the court of appeals.
D. f'hen the Agency Allegedly Errs in Applying Constitutional Principles
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation93 the United States Supreme Court indicated
how the declaratory order94 might be used to resolve a constitutional question.95
At issue was whether the agency's license revocation procedures authorized it to
prohibit the airing of a profanity-ridden comedy monologue entitled "Filthy
Words."' 9 6 Pacifica, the licensee, argued that the Commission's order prohibit-
ing further broadcast was an invalid exercise of its authority to declare the law
by declaratory order. 97 Significantly, the Court recognized the declaratory or-
der as a means to resolve uncertainties about the meaning of an agency's statu-
tory charter and regulations, but a more important principle of the case was
implicit. The Court's affirmance of a declaratory order in a context that did not
involve formal adjudication confirmed 98 that the declaratory order is available
anticipatorily; an agency may avoid the use of its formal adjudicatory powers at
a later date by issuing a declaratory order when the dispute arises. Likewise, in
situations similar to the one in Pacifica, a licensee might initiate the declaratory
order process to determine whether particular contemplated actions enjoy con-
stitutional protection.
E. When the Agency Allegedly Acts in Excess of Its Jurisdiction
Bituminous Coal Operators' Association v. Secretary of Interior99 illustrates
a typical request for relief from agency action that allegedly exceeds authority
delegated by Congress. Although the case reached the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on review of the lower court's refusal to grant
declaratory relief,1°° the issue could have been raised more efficiently by use of a
declaratory order. In dispute was the Secretary's statutory authority to impose
was established by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 201(a), 92 Stat. 1119
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1105 (1982)).
92. Obremski, 699 F.2d at 1267.
93. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
94. Although the Supreme Court spoke in conclusory terms and failed to discuss the APA in
detail, it specifically recognized the Commission's order as a declaratory order under § 554(e). Id. at
734.
95. Id. at 742.
96. See id at 751 ("Appendix to the Opinion of the Court").
97. Id. at 734.
98. Id.
99. 547 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1977).
100. Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n v. Hathaway, 406 F. Supp. 371 (W.D. Va. 1975), aff'd
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vicarious liability on mining companies for violations of health and safety stan-
dards by the independent general contractor construction companies they em-
ployed.10 1 The mining companies sought a declaratory judgment to establish
that the construction companies were "operators" within the meaning of the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969102 and were, therefore, di-
rectly liable for their own violations.103
After two years of litigation the court of appeals held that because the con-
struction companies were statutory agents of the owners and lessees of the coal
mines the mining companies could be held liable for construction company vio-
lations.1°4 The two year delay is noteworthy because the Secretary of the Inte-
rior 0 5 was aware of the need for a judicial determination; contradictory
interpretations of the Secretary's authority had previously been issued by the
Board of Mine Operations Appeals and the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia.'
0 6
The agency, either in response to a request for a declaratory order or on its
own initiative,I 07 could have expedited a determination by the court of appeals.
No factual questions had to be resolved; there was substantial uncertainty about
enforcement of the statute; and the planning considerations of the mine owners,
the construction companies, and the mine workers suggested the need for a
prompt answer. Furthermore, there was no good reason to await commence-
ment of the agency's sanctioning process against the mining companies when
removal of the uncertainty of prosecution would have allowed the mining com-
panies to proceed with their business planning in an informed manner.10 8
Because no declaratory order was issued, the mining companies had to
await the agency's attempted sanctions and then proceed to the district court for
a declaratory judgment. The suit for injunctive and declaratory relief became
the first judicial test of the agency's conduct. Issuance of a declaratory order
sub nom. Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n v. Secretary of the Interior, 547 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.
1977).
101. Bituminous Coal Operators'Ass'n, 547 F.2d at 243.
102. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-878 (1982).
103. Bituminous Coal Operators's Ass'n, 547 F.2d at 246.
104. Id. at 247.
105. The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-878 (1982), is
enforced by the Secretary of the Interior through inspectors who are authorized to require operators
of coal mines and their agents to withdraw miners from dangerous areas. Id. § 814(d). Inspectors'
decisions are reviewable by the Board of Mine Operations Appeals, and the Board's decisions are
reviewable by federal courts of appeal. Id. §§ 815-816.
106. The court in Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n noted that the Board of Mine Operations
Appeals previously had held "that coal mine construction companies were subject to the health and
safety standards of the Act and that they could be cited for violations." Bituminous Coal Operators'
Ass'n, 547 F.2d at 243 (citing Affinity Mining Co., 2 IBMA 57, 1971-73 OSHD I 15,546 (1973);
Wilson v. Laurel Shaft Constr. Co., 1 IBMA 217, 1971-73 OSHD % 15,387 (1972)). In contrast, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia had held "that the Secretary could not cite
mine construction companies for violating the Act. . . . Complying with that court's decision, the
Secretary ordered his inspectors to issue citations to mining companies for violations of the Act
committed by the construction companies they [employed]." Id.
107. See supra note 63.
108. See supra text accompanying note 29 (discussing use of declaratory order to remove
uncertainty).
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arguably would have been a better litigation strategy on the part of the agency.
Not only would such an order have given greater emphasis to the agency's role
as Congress' expert delegee, 109 it also would have preserved the opportunity for
initial judicial review in the court of appeals by judges, who are primarily re-
sponsible for reviewing agency actions. 110
F. When the Agency Allegedly Acts in a Procedurally Flawed Manner
An affected member of the public who believes an agency is violating its
own procedures in pursuing an administrative prosecution may employ the de-
claratory order to clarify the agency's procedural rules.111 The potential class of
such disputants is large and in some respects consists of persons with cdntradic-
tory motives. It includes both persons who genuinely do not know of thei'.r obli-
gations under a statute or rule and those who genuinely disagree about such
obligations. This broad class is also likely to include persons who have not yet
engaged in questionable conduct as well as persons who are seeking to plan their
future conduct in light of past acts that might result in sanctions if discovered.
Questions of honesty aside, this latter type of inquirer shares with the others an
understandable assumption: the public is entitled to know what the law is.112
Furthermore, the APA does not predicate procedural relief on moral upright-
ness. Instead, the APA extends judicial review to a "person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute." 113
United States v. Advance Machine Co. 114 illustrates the circumstances that
can give rise to a request for a declaratory order to remove uncertainty about
statutory procedures. In an enforcement action under the Consumer Product
Safety Act 1 5 the government sought civil penalties against defendant company
for violation of the Act's requirement that manufacturers report their defective
or hazardous products. 116 Defendant had failed to report that it manufactured
an automatic baseball pitching machine whose arm, "even when disconnected
from its power source," could "unexpectedly swing forward and downward at
great speed, striking any person within its range." 117
109. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (Agencies are "equipped
or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge" and their "findings within
the field carry the authority of expertness.").
110. See, eg., NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498, 502 (1951) (Courts of appeal have
been charged by Congress "with the normal and primary responsibility for granting or denying
enforcement of Labor Board orders.").
11. See, eg., supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
112. See, eg., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 613-14 (1971) (If state law fails to give
persons adequate notice as to what specific conduct is prohibited, the prohibitions will be deemed
unconstitutionally vague.).
113. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). More importantly, attempts to distinguish nefarious individuals
from their morally superior counterparts are not likely to be successful; generally, agencies have no
practical basis for determining the ethical motivations of an inquirer.
114. 547 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Minn. 1982).
115. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2064, 2068, 2069 (1983).
116. Advance Mach. Co., 547 F. Supp. at 1088.
117. Id.
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Defendant argued that because the Commission had learned of the defect
and of defendant's failure to report it eight years earlier, the Act's five year
statute of limitations barred a civil penalty action.' 18 In substance the claim was
that the Act's requirement of immediate reporting created a complete violation
once a manufacturer failed to inform the Commission of a defective or hazard-
ous product.'1 9 Under this theory, defendant asserted that the government had
to commence a penalty suit under the Act within five years of a manufacturer's
failure to report a defective or hazardous product.
120
The district court rejected defendant's claim. It held that "a manufacturer,
possessing information that its product contains a defect which could create a
substantial product hazard, has a continuing duty to inform the Commission
unless the Commission has been adequately informed of such defect."' 12 1 The
district court pointed out, moreover, that defendant's interpretation of the Act
would vitiate Congress' intent to increase the likelihood that the Commission
would learn of substantial product hazards in a timely fashion.122 As the court
noted, "[u]nder defendant's interpretation,. . . a manufacturer could violate the
reporting requirement without fear of punishment if it could successfully hide
the evidence of the product defect from the Commission for five years."'
123
One troublesome aspect of the Advance Machine Co. decision is that the
district court, not the agency, initially addressed defendant's novel interpreta-
tion of the Act, an interpretation that was admittedly "not without merit and
.. . limited support in the statute."'124 In addition, even though Advance
Machine may not have acted in good faith, there is a legitimate question whether
a company adopting Advance Machine's view of the reporting obligation would
have had a practical alternative to resisting reporting and challenging attempted
sanctions at the enforcement stage. It is possible that after some five years with-
out threat of sanctions, Advance Machine believed the matter to be so far behind
it that adverse publicity from reporting the stale claim would interfere with its
legitimate planning for the future. The dilemma of the confused but well-inten-
tioned person is not beyond the APA's contemplation. The APA provides the
declaratory order as a declaratory judgment device to answer novel questions
such as those raised in Advance Machine Co. As soon as the Commission
learned of the statute of limitations issue in that case, it could have issued a
declaratory order.
The existence of a declaratory order setting forth a formal comprehensive
agency statement serves five purposes that are applicable to Advance Machine
Co. and to each of the six situations discussed above. First, it preserves difficult
118. Id. at 1089.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1090.
122. Id. See generally S. REP. No. 251, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 993, 994 (Act designed to reduce injuries caused by consumer products by
promoting disclosure of possible hazards).
123. Advance Mach. Co., 547 F. Supp. at 1090.
124. Id. at 1089.
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issues for initial review by the court of appeals, a tribunal having more experi-
ence with agency oversight than the district court. Second, it serves as a disin-
centive to litigation. Expedited appellate review allows the agency's views to be
tested without the'delay created by trial court proceedings and thereby deters
litigation that is sought only for its dilatory effect. Third, the declaratory order
has res judicata effect in the event it is not appealed. Fourth, a declaratory order
serves the agency's strategic purposes once appellate review has begun. Not
only is the agency able to present a well-briefed legal order to the reviewing
court, it is also able to defend concrete final action with known effects, rather
than being forced to contend with the often hypothetical balancing of the equi-
ties common in suits for temporary injunctive relief.
Last, when uncertainty is involved, providing regulated persons an opportu-
nity to know their legal obligations is a legitimate end in itself. The status of an
agency is enhanced when it seeks enforcement penalties only after the agency
has made well-publicized efforts to persuade regulated persons to conform to the
law and to seek agency advice when in doubt. In a dispute about the rights and
duties of a regulated person, it is not justifiable to regulate through intimidation
when a determination on the merits can be secured easily. Moreover, when reg-
ulated persons are genuinely uncertain, the availability of a speedy and definitive
judicial determination may induce earlier compliance. If the company in Ad-
vance Machine Co. had been able to secure a declaratory order, 125 it would have
learned more quickly that as a continuing violator the only way it could put the
matter behind it was to report the defect and face the possibility of a sanction.
IV. CONCLUSION
The declaratory order offers an opportunity for more efficient and equitable
resolution of a variety of disagreements involving agencies and the public. It has
gained increasing recognition as an administrative device for summary judgment
disposition of disputes that involve no significant issues of material fact. Fur-
thermore, it is likely that agencies' willingness to use the summary judgment
application 126 of the order will increase. Prodding by the Supreme Court 127 and
the Administrative Conference of the United States 128 has promoted greater
awareness of this type of declaratory order. Recognition of the summary judg-
ment use of the order, however, will realize only part of Congress' vision for the
declaratory order-the part that is of more assistance to the regulators than to
the regulated.
The remaining task is to bring the declaratory judgment use of the declara-
tory order out from the shadows. This undertaking will not be easy because in
some respects the declaratory order is an anomaly. It reflects the delicate com-
125. To be meaningful, of course, an anonymous inquiry would have to be permitted.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 21-26.
127. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) (full use of formal adjudi-
catory procedures is not always required).
128. See Summary Decision in Agency Adjudication (Recommendation No. 70-3), 1 C.F.R.
§§ 305.70-.73 (1984) (encouraging increased use of administrative summary judgment).
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promise dictated by political concerns surrounding the enactment of the
APA. 129 The declaratory order exists despite congressional concern about
granting judicial review of agency actions prior to completion of the usual
processes of administrative adjudication. 130 Even though it granted agencies the
power to make preadjudicatory determinations of rights, Congress intended for
agencies to retain the discretion to refuse declaratory judgment-type relief when
the circumstances warranted it.' 3 ' The resulting ambiguous provision that de-
claratory orders may be granted subject to the "sound discretion" of the agency
has prompted dissatisfaction on the part of both agencies and the public.132 Re-
grettably, however, in the absence of aggressive judicial oversight, only agencies
have possessed the power to redress their dissatisfaction. The agencies' solution
has been simple: ignore the declaratory judgment aspect of the declaratory or-
der. As a result, Congress' cautious extension of declaratory administrative re-
lief has become a hollow victory.133 What was intended as a delegation of power
coupled with suitable safeguards has produced agency inaction and disregard of
congressional intent. In their sound discretion, 134 agencies generally have been
more willing to declare the impropriety of declaratory judgment-type relief than
to use section 554(e) to remove uncertainty.
Chance, rather than the agencies' systematic adoption of regulations imple-
menting section 554(e), dictates whether declaratory relief will be available. 135
129. In Intercity Transp. Co. v. United States, 737 F.2d 103, 106 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated:
The legislative history of 5 U.S.C § 554(e) does not provide definitive guidance on whether
Congress intended the phrase, "sound discretion," to limit agencies' authority to decline to
issue declaratory orders. Some concern, however, about allowing such decisions to remain
entirely in the discretion of agencies is evident in the development of the Administrative
Procedure Act.
130. See Powell, supra note 2, at 362 (congressional history of the APA); see also Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (statements of agency policy
and interpretive rules generally are not immediately reviewable).
The prevailing view is that the standard of review of a rule (or for that matter, the substantiality
of the impact resulting from a rule) does not affect the rulemaking procedure an agency is required
to use. Absent a statute requiring on-the-record rulemaking, the agency's standard is unvarying
because it is not the intensity of judicial review, but the requirements of the statute that dictate
agency procedures. Thus, in the usual case, an agency simply must avoid action that is arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. See I K. DAviS,
ADMINIsrtATIvE LAW TREATISE § 6.6, at 465 (2d ed. 1979). The Administrative Conference of
the United States recommends, however, that agencies voluntarily adopt the notice and comment
procedures for substantive rulemaking set forth in § 553 of the APA when issuing interpretive rules
of general applicability and statements of general policy to encourage "greater confidence in and
broader acceptance of ultimate agency decisions." Recommendation 76-5, Interpretive Rules of Gen-
eralApplicability and Statements of General Policy, in 4 AD. CoNF. U.S. 62 (1979). The Conference
notes that courts have occasionally imposed such requirements. Id. For the proposition that inter-
pretive regulations with great substantive impact are reviewable, see National Ass'n of Ins. Agents v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 489 F.2d 1268, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam)
(court determined that the interpretive regulation examined did not satisfy requirements for review).
131. Intercity Transp. Co. v. United States, 737 F.2d 103, 108-10 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (ICC's deci-
sion not to issue a declaratory order on the ground that to do so would be an inefficient allocation of
agency resources was held to be supported by a rational basis).
132. See supra note 8; Powell, supra note 2, at 347 n.34.
133. Powell, supra note 2, at 347.
134. See id. at 346-47.
135. In the absence of clear action by agencies to implement § 554(e), courts have filled the void.
When a court is uninformed, an agency may lose what should have been a valid declaratory order.
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The availability of judicial review of agency action is similarly uncertain: either
an agency must be too inept to craft its advice as hypothetical, tentative, and
nonsubstantive so that judicial review can be avoided, or a judge must be deter-
mined to disregard such indicia of nonreviewable agency action.136 Congress,
however, intended a more certain course; it did not envision agency regulation
by bluff and bluster. It provided the declaratory order as a flexible tool, for the
benefit of the public and the agencies alike, to remove uncertainty and to termi-
nate controversies.
In City of Miami v. ICC, 669 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1982), for example, the appellate court refused to
extend its jurisdiction over litigation between the City of Miami and the Florida East Coast Railway.
In an attempt to thwart condemnation by the City, the Railway had obtained a declaratory order
from the ICC denominating its ocean terminal a "line of railroad" subject to the Commission's
exclusive jurisdiction. The court of appeals, however, refused to recognize that the Commission's
discontinuance of its proceedings was sufficient to render its order "final." The ruling, which relied
on Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71
(1970), and Bames Freight Line v. ICC, 569 F.2d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 1978), accorded finality only to
agency actions by and from which "rights or obligations have been determined or legal consequences
will flow." City of Miami, 669 F.2d at 221. By suggesting that only Commission action on an
application for abandonment could render the "line of railroad" determination reviewable, the court
prolonged what it recognized as "already. . . interminable litigation." Id. at 222.
136. See 4 K. DAvis, supra note 130, § 25.12, at 389-93. Davis discusses the law of ripeness for
judicial review in light of Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and
concludes that what is critical to pre-enforcement judicial review determinations is the balancing of
hardship to the plaintiff against the problems that such review is likely to cause the agency. 4 K.
DAvis, supra note 130, § 25.12, at 392. Note, however, that Davis' discussion focuses on what
courts may do when confronted with a demand for judicial review of agency action. Section 554(e),
on the other hand, responds to the authority of the agency, itself, to provide pre-enforcement relief,
Nevertheless, these two institutional determinations have much in common. The catalogue of con-
siderations that Davis mentions as instructive for purposes of identifying when courts should find
ripeness also suggests how agencies might frame their actions so that ripeness probably will not be
found. Read conversely as a catalogue of agency considerations to be addressed to increase the
probability that agency answers to inquiries will not unintentionally be made reviewable, the cata-
logue suggests that the agency's responses ought to incorporate boiler plate language evidencing
some or all of the following points: that the agency views its response as nothing more than a
response to a hypothetical inquiry; that the agency is unsure about whether, as presented, the in-
quirer has raised a significant question of fact or law which would justify that agency's full analysis;
that the agency views the inquiry as raising a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot fully be
resolved within the constraints of the agency's available personnel and time; that the agency is ad-
dressing abstract issues that go beyond those specifically raised by the inquirer; that the agency
invites the use of further opportunities for the inquirer to submit a more particularized statement of
the problem, using available procedures and a particular format for the inquiry so that a more com-
plete consideration of the issue might be provided; that the agency response lacks independent coer-
cive effect; that the agency desires a fuller record, perhaps created through the formal adjudicatory
process, to adequately examine the question; that the agency is intentionally preliminary in its re-
sponse, because the necessity of having to be definitive would dissuade it from attempting to provide
even the cautionary guidance it is offering; that the agency foresees no onerous scheme of penalties
applying should a violation occur, while disclaiming any attempt to anticipate the results if and
when a sanctioning effort should ensue; that the agency expressly reserves the possibility that its
position might change if and when presented with more concrete evidence; and that the agency has
not responded through the head of the agency, its board, or its commission. Finally, if all else fails
and the agency finds itself in court urging that no injunction should issue, it should submit an affida-
vit from the head of the agency attesting, post hoc, that all of the above-mentioned conditions existed
at the time of the agency response.
Thus, it is the ease with which an agency can obfuscate its informal determinations that makes
the alternative availability of the declaratory order all the more important. Although the availability
of a declaratory order does not require that an agency reach the merits of every inquiry, it offers the
benefit of a specifically designed device whose format and consequences are known by the agency
and public at the outset, rather than designed ad hoc by the judiciary on the basis of its own balanc-
ing of the equities.
[Vol. 64
AGENCY USE OF DECLARA TORY ORDERS
The benefits of declaratory orders are easily recognizable. Declaratory or-
ders are more authoritative than advice-giving through informal interpretive rul-
ings because declaratory orders issue from the highest echelon of an agency.
Furthermore, because declaratory orders test the legitimacy of an agency's ac-
tions, they contribute to a comprehensive statement of the agency's opera-
tions. 137 Relief may be obtained more expeditiously by seeking a declaratory
order than by seeking to amend either a rule or statute. Finally, because declar-
atory orders are statutorily prescribed, they carry a statutory presumption of
reviewability that agency advice-giving may lack. 138 By definition, section
554(e) declarations are to be treated "with like effect as in the case of other
orders."'
139
Despite these benefits, some forty years after its enactment, no systemic
procedural framework for the adjudicatory advice-giving function envisioned
under section 554(e) has developed. The present limited circumstances in which
final reviewable agency orders are made available prior to commencement of a
sanctioning process circumscribe Congress' intent too narrowly. The availabil-
ity of preadjudicatory, judicially reviewable agency relief cannot usefully be lim-
ited to strictly categorized, preselected questions that an agency deems it
advantageous to resolve. Nor should suits under the Declaratory Judgment
Act' 4° be the public's primary means for securing binding determinations about
the legitimacy of a proposed course of agency action. The failure to make de-
claratory order relief freely available promotes administrative inefficiency, in-
vites judicial interference, and feeds public distrust.
The lack of administrative declaratory judgment relief, nevertheless, might
be justified on the ground that agencies have eliminated the need for declaratory
judgment-type relief by their general willingness to use interpretive and substan-
tive rulemaking powers freely. Such an argument deserves dismissal on both
conceptual and policy grounds. Conceptually, no process for rendering authori-
tative agency advice or opinions can be equivalent to declaratory orders under
section 554(e) unless it meets three criteria. It must be: (1) available in relation
to all formal adjudications without limitation as to subject matter; (2) available
at the initiation of either an affected citizen or the agency; and (3) ripe for judi-
cial review upon issuance.
141
Measured against these criteria, so-called adequate substitutes for section
554(e) relief amount to no real substitutes at all. Consider, for example, the
three most often touted alternatives: interpretive rules and guidelines, jurisdic-
tional rulings, and advisory opinions. Interpretive rules and guidelines are by
definition nonsubstantive and not ripe for judicial review.14 2 They provide only
137. See 1 K. DAVIs, supra note 1, § 5.02, at 294 (discussing early distinctions among agency
actions that could be termed declaratory).
138. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D) (1982); see Powell, supra note 2, at 370 (discussing reviewability
of the declaratory order).
139. 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1982).
140. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 5-9.
142. See supra note 130.
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generalized knowledge about whether a proposed course of action is likely to be
tolerated by an agency.1 43 Jurisdictional rulings are final, but are limited to
narrow, preselected questions that the agency has identified. 144 Advisory opin-
ions from an agency's counsel provide no better alternative to declaratory order
relief. Advisory opinions give protection to petitioners who comply with them,
but provide neither protection nor an assured avenue to judicial review for indi-
viduals who choose to disregard them. 145 Currently, therefore, there are no ade-
quate substitutes for Congress' extension of administrative declaratory judgment
relief.
In addition, as a matter of governmental and judicial policy, there are sig-
nificant drawbacks to agency determinations that are limited either as to subject
matter or as to the applicable scope of judicial review. First, Congress' intent
that agencies operate within properly delegated spheres of authority is under-
mined when improper agency action is allowed to go unchallenged. If agencies
can dissuade regulated persons from proposed action by creating uncertainty
about the likely consequences of such action, then agencies can operate under a
143. See supra note 130; see also 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 21.00, at 305-07 (Supp. 1982)
(summarizing what Davis views as a departure from a series of holdings by the Supreme Court
between 1919 and 1953 and the emergence of a "fundamentally different" view of the ripeness doc-
trine). As Davis sees it: "The key idea of the present law [of ripeness] is very simple: Controversies
are ripe for judicial determination when the legal issues are appropriate for courts to decide and
when hardship to private parties from lack of decision is substantial." Id. at 305-06.
The Davis view is helpful as far as it goes. What it does not address is the practical concern that
the declaratory order was intended to resolve. Even under a more liberal view of the doctrine of
ripeness, there remains the problem of securing an expedited determination of the law. Although a
"fundamental" change of view might mean that a district court is likely to be more sympathetic in
allowing challenges that previously would have been foreclosed until the agency actually sought to
apply its policy or interpretation to a specific set of facts, the hoped for liberal interpretation must
nevertheless be sought in the district court. For a definitive determination on an adverse ruling, the
affected person must still face judicial review in the court of appeals. In addition, it will be difficult
to convince the district court that "the legal issues are appropriate for courts to decide and...
hardship to private parties from lack of decision is substantial." Id.
The declaratory order responds to these practical concerns. The agency itself-not the district
court-must necessarily determine whether the circumstances warrant the order. Moreover, if the
agency's decision on the merits is not favorable to the petitioner, review is immediate and "with like
effect as in the case of other orders." 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1982).
144. For example, the National Labor Relations Board provides for a narrowly defined type of
declaratory order in the form of a jurisdictional ruling, by which the Board may determine whether
it will "assert jurisdiction on the basis of its current standards." 29 C.F.R. § 102.98(a) (1985).
145. The uncertain utility of devices that fall short of the statutorily defined declaratory order is
evidenced by the confusion generated by the Securities and Exchange Commission's use of no-action
letters. In Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 662-63 (D.C. Cir. 1970), va-
cated, 404 U.S. 403 (1971), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held reviewable a Commission determination that it would take no action against the Dow Chemical
Company's Board of Directors for refusing to include a shareholders' resolution in its proxy state-
ment. On almost identical facts, however, the same court in Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641, 643-44
(D.C. Cir. 1974), held:
We think members of the Commission's staff, like staff personnel of other agencies, "have
no authority individually or collectively to make 'orders,'" and that, on the contrary,
"[o]nly the Commission makes orders." Here the Commission made no order on the mer-
its of petitioner's claim; rather, it emphatically "declined to review the staff's position." It
follows that what petitioner seeks to have reviewed in this court is not an "order issued by
the Commission."
The act of legerdemain in distinguishing the cases was possible in the court's view because in
Medical Comm. for Human Rights the Commission actually affirmed the staff's conclusion, whereas
in Kixmiller it refused to pass on the staff's decision. Kixmiller, 492 F.2d at 644.
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de facto extension of their delegated authority. Such expansions can be resisted
only if affected citizens risk the threat of agency sanction to test the legality of
the agency's position on judicial review.
Second, agencies that rely solely on interpretive or jurisdictional determina-
tions are unable to remedy the indirect injuries they inflict on those whom they
regulate. No practical way exists to determine the extent to which regulated
parties desist from otherwise legitimate activities because perseverance in the
face of threatened agency sanctions is too costly. Beyond the shift of political
power represented by unauthorized extensions of agency authority, therefore, a
meaningful assessment of the unavailability of declaratory relief must include an
analysis of opportunity costs. When an agency improperly lays claim to Con-
gress' authority, it simultaneously precludes negotiations within the regulated
market. Absent judicial willingness to treat nonsubstantive agency determina-
tions as final reviewable agency orders, sole reliance by agencies on advice-giving
based on their rulemaking powers assures that government will be injected into
private planning processes in direct contravention of the political balance in-
tended by the APA.146
Third, and probably least appreciated, sole reliance on agency rulemaking
powers encourages agencies to ignore more efficient ways of resolving questions
and potential disputes. Section 554(e) ought to complement formal adjudica-
tory powers when the agency confronts questions whose immediate resolution
would either allow an end to formal agency adjudication of a dispute or facilitate-
removal of legal uncertainties that might later lead to formal adjudication.
Some progress has occurred in the use of declaratory orders to end adjudication
of disputes. 14 7 The summary judgment use of the declaratory order promises to
expedite the resolution of disputes so that judicial review may be readily ob-
tained. By contrast, agencies have failed to use the declaratory order to remove
uncertainties and streamline their operations. They have refused to review re-
curring patterns of disputes to determine whether regulated persons are. need-
lessly subjected to the costs of planning under threat of government sanctions.
Instead, agencies have permitted judicial processes to fill the void left by the
unavailability of definitive administrative determinations. This practice has
forced regulated persons to divert resources from planning to achieve novel, but
legitimate, ends to planning to avoid sanctions.
Ultimately, however, agencies must consider concerns that override even
the instrumental considerations addressed here. What agencies often ignore by
146. The United States Supreme Court has said that the political accommodations reflected in
the APA were aimed at reforming arbitrary and biased use of administrative adjudicatory power.
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950), modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1959). Although, in
Justice Jackson's words, the APA is full of "compromises and generalities and, no doubt, some
ambiguities," it is a "formula upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest."
Id. at 40. The purposes of the APA were to "introduce greater uniformity of procedure and stand-
ardization of administrative practice among the diverse agencies whose customs departed widely
from each other" and "to curtail and change the practice of embodying in one person or agency the
duties of prosecutor and judge." Id. at 41.
147. See supra notes 13 & 127-28 and accompanying text; see also Powell, supra note 2, at 370
(discussing the Supreme Court's recognition of the sensible advantages of summay judgment).
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failing to make administrative declaratory judgments freely available is that sec-
tion 554(e) is a congressionally created procedure. It responds to our
lawmakers' perception of the need for an administrative procedure under which
regulated persons could secure judicial review of disputed legal positions with-
out risking agency sanctions. As yet, that objective remains unrealized, because
the so-called substitutes for section 554(e) lack the significant requirements of
general availability and reviewability that are characteristic of the declaratory
order. These section 554(e) "substitutes" merely indulge the agencies' desire to
assert their view of the law without the scrutiny of judicial review. What the
agencies seek to avoid is nothing less than the critical issue whether their view of
the law is legally authorized.
Although informal advice-giving and other devices by which agencies dis-
seminate their views of the law are valuable aids to regulated persons, agency
procedures that encourage the issuance of final, judicially reviewable declara-
tions of the law prior to the commencement of sanctioning processes are badly
needed. Agencies should be prepared to terminate controversies when judicial
review is appropriate and to remove uncertainties that might otherwise lead to
such controversies. To this end it is imperative that agencies authorized to issue
declaratory orders under the APA undertake the initiatives outlined below.
A. Agency Advice-Giving Responsibilities
In appropriate circumstances and consistent with the availability of person-
nel, agencies should continue to give advice about their views of the law and
agency practice to members of the public. Agencies should publish specific sum-
maries of their advice-giving authority and procedures for circulation to the gen-
eral public.
Agencies should explicitly declare that, subject to the requirements of the
APA, disputes concerning an agency's legal authority may be resolved by de-
claratory order at the initiative of the agency or the regulated party, at any point
(1) during a formal adjudicatory hearing for purposes of terminating a contro-
versy; or (2) prior to initiation of the formal adjudicatory process, to remove
uncertainty that might otherwise result in a formal adjudication. Moreover,
agencies should identify and announce the policies governing circumstances in
which rulemaking advice (viz, interpretive and policy rules) and adjudicatory
advice-giving (vi, declaratory orders) generally will not be available.
B. Procedures for Obtaining Declaratory Orders
In particular, each agency should adopt and publish rules that describe two
basic types of procedures:
(1) How to obtain oral and written nonbinding advice from an agency's
local, regional, or national offices; and
(2) How to obtain a judicially reviewable agency adjudicatory determina-
tion pursuant to the declaratory order provision of section 554(e).
With respect to the first of these procedures, the agency should list specifi-
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cally all the designations it uses for agency determinations that it deems to be
nonbinding and, therefore, not subject to judicial review. With respect to the
second of these procedures, the agency's statement should explain specifically
and in detail how responses to requests for interpretive and policy advice that
the inquirer deems unsatisfactory will be handled. At a minimum the statement
should include the following information:
(a) The name, title, and address of the agency official who is authorized to
receive petitions for declaratory orders;
(b) The special considerations, if any, that the agency thinks relevant to
whether a declaratory order should issue (for example, that the matter raises a
substantial question of law or involves a substantial financial interest; that the
matter not be the subject of any other agency's investigations or proceedings; or
that the facts be clearly settled);
(c) The court, if other than a federal court of appeals, that reviews orders
issued by the agency;
(d) The recommended format, if any, for petitions for declaratory orders;
(e) Whether petitions for declaratory orders may be requested
confidentially;
(f) The procedures (viz., exparte, notice and comment, oral presentations,
affirmations, and so forth) governing the declaratory order process;
(g) The time frame in which the agency will attempt to rule on petitions
for declaratory orders; and
(h) The source from which copies of previously issued declaratory orders
may be obtained.
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